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Networks of injustice and worker mobilisation at Walmart 
 
Alex J Wood 
 
Abstract  
This paper investigates the use of Internet networks during the recent mobilisation of 
Californian Walmart workers. The findings of this case study suggest that Internet based 
mass self-communication networks (Facebook, YouTube etc.) can complement traditional 
organising techniques. Mass self-communication networks ameliorate many of the 
weaknesses identified by previous studies of Internet networks. In particular, these types 
of networks can help overcome negative dispositions towards unions, increase the density 
of communication and the level of participation amongst members, create a collective 
identity congruent with trade unionism, facilitate organisation and spread ‘swarming 
actions’ which are effective at leveraging symbolic power. Moreover, unions may be well 
suited to providing crucial strategic oversight and coordination to wider worker 
networks.  
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The late 20th and early 21st centuries have been marked by an extraordinary decline in 
private sector trade unions across many advanced capitalist countries. Of particular note 
has been the dramatic decline in membership and collective bargaining coverage in the 
United States (US), along with the scale and scope of labour movement collective action, 
most obviously strike activity (Milkman, 2013). However, in 2012 the US labour 
movement unexpectedly gained media prominence. In the last week of November, 
around 600 Walmart and fast food workers took part in widely publicised strikes 
(Eidelson, 2013; Greenhouse, 2012; Milkman, 2013). The striking workers were not, 
however, members of unions, belonging instead to worker networks (Coulter, 2013) 
which more closely resembled worker centres, that is, ‘non-union labour-oriented 
advocacy groups’  (Milkman, 2013: 648).  
Worker centres have played an increasingly important role in the US labour 
movement since the early 1990s. Running highly visible and often successful campaigns 
on the behalf of low paid non-unionised workers, particularly those employed in the 
service sector (Milkman, 2013). Over the last two decades, the number of worker centres 
has grown at a rapid rate, increasing from only four in 1992 to over 200 in 2010 (Fine, 
2011).  
Unlike most worker centres, the Walmart and fast food workers’ organisations 
were membership-based, had been set up by unions, and retained close organisational and 
financial ties with organised labour. 'The Organization United for Respect at Walmart' 
(OUR Walmart) was founded clandestinely by the 'United Food and Commercial 
Workers International Union' (UFCW) in 2010 and various local fast food worker 
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associations were set up by the Service Employees International Union in 2012 
(Finnegan, 2014; Uetricht, 2013).  
The UFCW setup OUR Walmart, the focus of this article, after being contacted by 
a group of Chicago workers seeking union representation. Following this contact, the 
UFCW decided to form and support a network for Walmart workers rather than initiate a 
traditional unionisation campaign. During this initial recruitment phase, efforts focused 
upon face-to-face organising, principally visiting the homes of workers who had been 
identified as sympathetic during previous UFCW campaigns or as a result of organisers 
making contact with them during store visits.1 Around a year later in June 2011, the 
worker network went public and launched its website and Facebook page, and conducted 
a survey of workers. The public launching of the campaign was covered by a 1250 word 
article in the New York Times by Greenhouse (2011). The network was created through 
traditional face-to-face organising, but over time mass self-communication networks 
(MSCNs), such as Facebook, became increasingly important in complementing physical 
activities. 
The mobilisation of low-wage service workers maintained its momentum 
throughout 2013, with around 200 Walmart workers taking part in strikes alongside a 
campaign of civil disobedience leading to over 250 arrests ('Making Change at Walmart', 
2014; OUR Walmart, 2014) while the number of fast food strikers grew to over 2000 
(Fox News, 2013; Tritch, 2013). This article explores the role of Internet facilitated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Workers' addresses were located through electoral registers. 
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networks (IFN) and in particular MSCN (e.g. Facebook, YouTube etc.) in the 
mobilisation of Walmart workers in California during 2012 and 2013. 
 There has been much research to evaluate the benefits, drawbacks, and threats 
which IFNs represent to unions. However, very little research evaluates the ways in 
which traditional PC website and email- based IFNs differ from multi-platform MSCNs. 
Contemporary MSCN are not limited to PCs but can be accessed through wireless mobile 
devices (principally smartphones) and have proliferated during this decade.2 Of particular 
importance is their ability to overcome the problems which have been identified for 
unions with regard to traditional IFNs. This article limits itself to evaluating the role of 
MSCNs in the mobilisation. More traditional elements related to workplace mobilisation 
also played a key role. Of particular importance were: face-to-face organising through 
home and store visits and the holding of local worker meetings along with the principle 
of ‘like-recruits-like’, meaning that union organisers were of diverse ethnicity in order to 
match the make-up of the workforce. As will become evident from the analysis below, 
MSCNs should be understood as complementing traditional organising and facilitating 
particular forms; rather than as independent or spontaneous. Although touched upon 
where relevant, it is not possible to fully detail the more traditional elements of the 
mobilisation here.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  	  For example, by 2011, 35% of adults in the US owned smartphones. This increased to 52% by 
2013 (Smith, 2013) while in 2009 30% used social networking sites (Jones and Fox 2009) this 
figure had increased to 71% for Facebook alone by 2013 (Duggan et al., 2014).	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This article will proceed by further outlining the Walmart workers' mobilisation 
during the period 2012-2013 with particular reference to the mobilisation in California. 
The extant literature on unions and IFNs will then be reviewed and the benefits and 
problems for unions highlighted. The methods employed in this study will then be 
explained, the findings presented and discussed in relation to the extant literature, and 
conclusions drawn.  
 
OUR Walmart  
Walmart is the world's largest private sector employer with a global workforce of 2.2 
million, 1.4 million of whom are hourly-paid workers in the US (Walmart, 2013). 
Walmart is also the biggest US corporation by revenue (Fortune 500, 2013). This 
employer provides an interesting case with which to study the potential for networking 
labour through IFNs because it exemplifies many of the difficulties facing the 
contemporary labour movement. For example, workers have little access to ‘structural 
economic power’ as the work does not require ‘high-skill’ levels, workers are drawn from 
loose labour markets and cannot easily disrupt their employer's operations or other 
strategic sectors of the economy (Silver, 2003). Moreover, workers cannot easily 
compensate for this lack of structural power through traditional forms of associational 
power (Wright, 2000; Silver, 2003) as Walmart has repeatedly proved its ability to defeat 
unionisation attempts in the US (Lichtenstein, 2009).  
Nevertheless, by 2012 thousands of Walmart workers had joined OUR Walmart 
and these workers then initiated Walmart’s first ever national strike. The strike, which 
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took place on 23 November 2012, ‘Black Friday’, the busiest US shopping day of the 
year, mobilised 400 workers (Eidelson, 2013) and 30,000 supporters across the US (OUR 
Walmart, 2013).  
In the year that followed, further strikes took place involving around 200 workers 
alongside a campaign of civil disobedience leading to over 250 arrests (Making Change 
at Walmart, 2014; OUR Walmart, 2014). The exact number of workers who joined OUR 
Walmart is confidential, but was claimed to have been in the thousands nationally, across 
700 stores (each with an average workforce of 300). The data discussed below suggests 
that, in California alone, there were over 1000 members. The handful of strongest stores 
in the Los Angeles (LA) and San Francisco Bay (Bay) Areas were reported as having a 
membership of around a hundred workers. However, more commonly, the most active 
stores had a membership in the range of a dozen to fifty workers and there were many 
stores with only half a dozen or fewer members. 
 Mobilisation at Walmart was facilitated by what were claimed to have been two 
separate organisations: the UFCW, a union with a broad membership of more than 1.3 
million across the retail, food processing, and meat packing industries; and the Walmart 
workers' network, OUR Walmart. In practice, however, the two organisations worked in 
tandem. The UFCW provided the majority of financial resources, as well as 
organisational and legal experience and expertise. For example, in the LA Area, the 
UFCW funded 10 organisers, meaning that the UFCW committed hundreds of thousands 
of dollars in wages alone to mobilising Walmart workers in the LA Area.  
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That the UFCW attempted to mobilise workers to join OUR Walmart rather than 
the UCFW itself can be partly explained by the fact that US labour law requires unions to 
hold formal workplace certification elections. This process is extremely one-sided owing 
to the principle of ‘employers’ right to free speech’ meaning that they can hold ‘captive-
audience assemblies’ while denying union access to the workforce. Even if the union 
does win the election, employers have become well practiced in delaying the signing of a 
legally binding collective agreement long enough to hold a deification election. Only one 
in twenty union campaigns now ends in the signing of a collective agreement 
(Lichtenstein, 2009).  
The mobilisation at Walmart should not, however, be understood as a ‘pre-union’ 
campaign (Heckscher and Carré, 2006), for even if OUR Walmart were to become a 
sustainable organisation there would still be little realistic likelihood of translating this 
into union recognition. Therefore, the mobilisation explicitly did not seek formal 
collective bargaining rights but, rather, followed the worker centre model of calling 
public attention to poor terms and conditions (Milkman, 2013). This approach represents 
a significant challenge to traditional concepts, such as the Webbs (1896), of what unions 
are and how they operate. The rationale behind this mobilisation will, therefore, be 
contrasted to traditional conceptions of unions in the discussion below. 
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The promise of IFNs  
The expansion of IFNs provides unions with a means with which to become networking 
organisations (Carter et al. 2003; Fitzgerald et al., 2012). The formation of networks, 
argue Heckscher and Carré (2006), represents a solution to the inability of contemporary 
labour movements to mobilise workers into large centralised and disciplined 
organisations. Networks have the advantage over traditional unions insofar as workers are 
less fearful that involvement will lead to retaliation and are not burdened by the negative 
impressions which many workers have of unions (Saundry et al., 2006; 2007). By tapping 
into these networks, unions can, even in hostile environments, gradually introduce young 
workers to ideas surrounding unionism and demonstrate their relevance. It is argued that 
this increases the likelihood that a new generation of workers will engage in union 
activities in the future (Panagiotopoulos, 2012; Saundry et al., 2006; 2012). Moreover, 
Saundry et al. (2006; 2012) find that networks can be effective at generating 
consciousness and awareness of workplace issues and can, therefore, play a role in the 
defence of workers’ terms and conditions.  
 The use of the Internet in the formation of networks has a number of additional 
potential benefits. An important one being the ability to increase the density of 
communication between members (Carter et al., 2003). It can also economically reduce 
time-space barriers to participation and services, something which is especially beneficial 
to women workers and workers who work non-standard shifts (Carter 2003; Diamond 
and Freeman, 2002; Fitzgerald et al. 2012; Greene et al., 2003; Saundry et al., 2006).  
IFNs can thus aid the generation of a sense of collectivism and consciousness of 
workplace issues by providing a space, beyond formal union structures, in which workers 
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can discuss workplace issues (Saundry et al., 2006; 2007). They also assist in the 
organisation of campaigns (Diamond and Freeman 2002; Saundry et al., 2007) and, when 
combined with a high level of communication technology, can enable 'swarming' 
collective action – the strategic pulsing of action from all directions (Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt, 2000). It is argued that swarming, which is a tremendous force multiplier, could 
provide labour with an effective new means of undertaking collective action (Heckscher 
and Carré, 2006). Importantly, swarming is also seen as being well-suited to reputational 
damage (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2000).   
Despite the significant promise which the extant literature suggests IFNs represent 
to worker organisation there are also a number of drawbacks, limitations and threats 
which have been identified. A major drawback is the sustainability of IFNs and their lack 
of solidity, which can limit their ability to achieve hard industrial relations outcomes 
(Carter et al., 2003; Greene et al., 2003; Fitzgerald et al., 2012; Heckscher and Carré, 
2006; Saundry et al., 2012). Many commentators suggest that there exists an 
incongruence between the horizontal and de-centred nature of networks, and the more 
bureaucratic, hierarchical, and centralised nature of unions (see for example: Diamond 
and Freeman 2002; Heckscher and Carré, 2006; Saundry et al. 2007; 2012). However, 
effective networks are not in fact based upon total autonomy, but rather, they need an 
‘orchestrator’ to provide strategic oversight, while still enabling members of the network 
to quickly and easily share information (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2000; Heckscher and 
Carré, 2006; Heckscher and McCarthy, 2014). Unions often fail to grasp this and use 
IFNs in traditional hierarchical ways based upon vertical downwards communication 
such as employing websites and email to post materials and information for members to 
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take up and use (Fitzgerald et al. 2012; Panagiotopoulos, 2012). The result is the 
tendency that such resources are only used by existing members, rather than attracting 
new members (Saundry et al. 2007).  
A further limitation is that Saundry et al. (2006; 2007; 2012) argue that they do 
not lead to the formation of a broad political identity compatible with contemporary trade 
unionism. Rather, networks foster a narrow collectivism based upon collegiality.Users of 
networks, it is argued, do not see themselves as members of an organisation, making it 
difficult for IFNs to adopt a clear political identity or a more substantive organisational 
form. This incompatibility means that unions cannot take over networks or set up their 
own. To do so would be self-defeating for it would inevitably erode the network’s 
identity. Alternativly, by linking with trade unions, networks can gain the organisation, 
institutional identity, and expertise to achieve concrete industrial relations outcomes. 
Saundry et al. (2012: 274), therefore, suggest that, instead of setting up networks, unions 
should tap into existing networks. However, networks themselves represent a threat to 
unions as they are alternative means of workplace collectivism and service provision 
(Diamond and Freeman, 2002; Panagiotopoulos and Barnett 2014; Saundry et al., 2007). 
The foregoing discussion is drawn from research into traditional IFNs as there is 
currently little research which specifically investigates MSCNs (Geelan, 2013). One 
important way in which MSCNs differ from IFNs is that, unlike traditional IFNs, they 
can be closely monitored and shut down from a central source (Bryson et al., 2010). 
However, evidence from the 2010 Chinese Honda strikes demonstrates that, as MSCNs 
became infiltrated, they can easily be  abandoned and new ones set up at little cost 
(Jianhua; 2011). Jianhua’s findings indicate that MSCNs share many of the benefits of 
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traditional IFNs. 
 
Method 
In order to investigate the role of MSCNs in workplace mobilisation, a broadly 
ethnographic approach, combining both participant and non-participant observations with 
semi-structured interviews, was used. California, particularly the LA and Bay Areas, 
were identified as having the highest concentrations of mobilisation and were therefore 
chosen as primary research sites. Data collection took place during two intensive 
fieldwork trips. The first of these took place from mid-February to mid-March 2013 and 
was timed to allow reflection upon the 2012 'Black Friday' strikes, as well as observation 
of mobilisation attempts for a mass fortnight long strike to coincide with Walmart’s 
annual share-holders’ meeting on 7 July 2013. The second took place for two weeks at 
the start of December 2013, timed to allow reflection upon the 2013 'Black Friday' 
protests and direct actions. The fieldwork included participation in, and observation of, 
organising drives at six stores, which also proved an excellent opportunity to speak with 
workers who were not mobilised, and attendance at two weekly union organiser 
meetings, two worker activist meetings, two worker activist national video conference 
calls, and three community ally meetings. This experiential and observational data was 
supported by 42 semi-structured interviews with 33 informants consisting of 24 non-
managerial hourly-paid employees (four of whom had recently left Walmart); one 
recently terminated salaried assistant manager who was active in OUR Walmart; seven 
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UFCW union organisers and one senior UFCW official. The research was not covert and 
all participants gave informed consent. All names have been anonymised. 
 
Networking injustice 
In order to elucidate the ways in which MSCNs influenced the mobilisation, the 
analysis is undertaken with reference to the influential approach known as 'Mobilisation 
Theory' (MT) (See Kelly, 1998). According to this theoretical perspective, dissatisfaction 
at work, while necessary, is not sufficient to trigger collective action. This dissatisfaction 
must be understood as the result of an illegitimate situation and thus an injustice, defined 
as a 'breach of legal or collective agreement, rights or of widely shared social values’ 
(Kelly, 2005: 66). Different actors in the workplace will attempt to influence the 
understanding of workplace issues by framing them in a particular way. Hence framing 
injustices represents one potential avenue through which MSCN may influence 
mobilisations. Organisers and activists to emphasised the disparity in Walmart's profits, 
the owners' wealth, and the executives’ pay relative to that of the workers, as well as 
comparing worker pay and conditions at Walmart to those of workers at unionised 
retailers. Moreover, Walmart attempted to legitimise these issues by stressing that the 
average pay of an associate was well above a living wage, and by highlighting the 
claimed pro-worker values of Walmart, as personified by the deceased founder Sam 
Walton. Additionally, managers sought to reduce opportunities for organisers to 
undertake this framing by having them ejected from stores, in some cases by the police. 
The ability of workplace activists to frame issues was also curtailed by managers 
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separating them from their workmates and increased managerial surveillance of their 
activities in the workplace.  
In this context, online spaces, or what Castells (2012) refers to as the ‘space of 
flows’, played an important role in facilitating framing. OUR Walmart’s Facebook group 
had 22,000 'likes' in May 2013 and provided an accessible space beyond the workplace in 
which framing could be undertaken. Below is a typical example of the way OUR 
Walmart’s attempted to frame Walmart’s pay as illegitimate through messages on their 
Facebook page: 
‘23 April 2013 
You have to be kidding. That's 1,000 times what an average Walmart Associate 
makes… [link] Walmart CEO’s pay jumps 14.1 percent to $20.7 million 
130 likes, 97 comments, 512 shares’  
MT holds that, for mobilisations to take place, feelings of injustice must transform 
into a sense of shared collective interests. The process by which injustices fuse into 
collective interests can be broken down into two elements; social identification with a 
group, and attribution of blame (Kelly, 1998). Social identification with a group requires 
a shared perception of being located in a particular group; distinct and defined in 
opposition to an out-group who have different interests and values. Moreover, a sense of 
injustice can be strengthened if shared by a substantial number of co-workers as this 
reinforces and legitimates it (Kelly, 1998).  
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At Walmart discussions in the workplace and meetings outside of the workplace 
with other workers from the local area played an important role in creating a perception 
of a distinct social group. But MSCNs aided this process by providing a discursive space 
in which union organisers and workers could further co-produce a collective identity of 
exploited workers. MSCNs also enabled high levels of communication between workers 
and organisers, enabling dispersed workers, either spatially in different stores or 
temporally on different shifts, to connect with each other. Through engaging in 
discussions over Facebook, workers were able to learn of situational similarities at each 
other’s stores and provide each other with practical and emotional support and thus 
fostered identification with each other’s situation. Akira, a recently terminated worker 
working as an organiser, explained this process particularly clearly:  
‘It is basically an outlet for, not only, frustration but also networking… seeing… 
what Walmart is doing now to other associates and comparing our similarities… 
just being there for one another so you know that you’re not the only one going 
through what you're going through and spreading the word about trying to change 
Walmart and get others to join in.’    
Tim, an activist in his late twenties, explained the profound effect of the realisation that a 
sense of injustice is shared by a wider collective: 
'It’s a great way for people, especially when they are first starting, to be introduced 
to the larger scope of things, because there is a difference when you’re used to 
dealing with your individual store and then when you see it is nationwide and 
you’re talking to other people - it kinda blows your mind away. A lot of workers 
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think that the problems they are experiencing are just this store or it’s just that 
manager, but everything else is great. But when they… hear or see the same 
problems they are dealing with being expressed by people in Washington State or 
New York or Texas they are just, like, wow!’ 
As suggested in the quote above a sense of group identity was further fostered 
visually by the uploading of videos on Facebook and YouTube of speeches by 
charismatic leaders and talismanic actions. These connections were possible despite the 
network being geographically dispersed across a vast country. Bill, a senior UFCW 
official, explained how mass self-communication massively expanded social interaction 
and social network density: 
‘It’s been transformative… there’s thousands of conversations happening every day 
amongst members of OUR Walmart…It’s totally widely open, people are building 
their own groups, they are learning from each other, they’re supporting each 
other… this campaign wouldn’t have been possible five years ago… it breaks down 
the barriers and the walls that people face in life and it’s also a place where people 
can support each other whether they are in the same store or across the nation and, 
lastly, it’s got a natural way that people can become engaged.’  
MSCNs were easily combined with traditional IFN communication, such as online video 
conference calls, which enabled workers from across the country to link together in order 
to discuss major issues, provide feedback, and make decisions. Furthermore, being a 
network provided a discursive platform from which, by stressing the fact that their social 
group was not a union but an association, they could circumvent the prevalent anti-union 
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prejudices of much of the workforce. This enabled easier identification with OUR 
Walmart by workers who would otherwise have been hostile to a ‘union’. 
‘Attribution’ refers to pinpointing a tangible target for action by placing blame 
upon an agency, normally the employer or the government, rather than impersonal forces 
such as 'the market' or 'global competition' (Kelly, 1998). Again, MSCNs aided this 
process by providing a discursive space in which union organisers and workers could 
foster the blaming of the owners. Initially, Walmart workers attributed blame to ‘greedy’ 
and ‘criminal’ owners and directors of Walmart who were deemed to be exploiting them. 
This can be seen particularly clearly in Pamela’s statement that: 
‘Walmart has been lying to them [the workers] because their slogan is ‘Save Money 
to Live Better’ but who’s actually living better? The Waltons, not their associates.’    
However, following the strikes by fast food workers, this identity coalesced into being a 
part of a wider ‘low-wage workers' movement.’ The workers thus came to see their 
mobilisation not as a sectional fight to improve their own conditions, but as part of wider 
battle to improve the conditions of low-paid workers. This was a common theme of the 
second batch of interviews carried out in December 2013 and was elucidated particularly 
clearly by a worker called Joe:    
‘What we are doing isn’t just for Walmart workers, it’s for everybody because 
everyone’s getting the shit of the deal right now… we are all allies, we need to 
stand together, you know what I mean - solidarity.’ 
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Clearly, the collective identity fostered here was not, as suggested in the literature above, 
one based upon notions of a collegial or occupational identity which would be 
incompatible with the broad political identity of contemporary trade unionism. Rather, it 
led to a general class-based identity of exploited workers.  
 
A mobilisation for ‘different times’ 
According to MT, for collective interests to translate into collective action, there must be 
an organisation that can provide the necessary resources. At Walmart both a union, the 
UFCW, and a worker network, OUR Walmart, played key roles. Despite the union’s 
close links and heavy support for OUR Walmart, it remained committed to trying to 
mobilise workers to join OUR Walmart, rather than the UFCW. OUR Walmart, for its 
part, explicitly did not seek to engage in the formal collective bargaining which is central 
to classic conceptualisations of trade unions. Although, the union played a vital role in 
the decision-making of the mobilisation, it did not do so in a bureaucratic manner. 
Instead, the network’s meetings, whether on-line or in person, were run in a participative 
manner, departing the formal process-heavy manner typical of union meetings. Union 
organisers played the role of facilitators, actively seeking out workers’ views and 
encouraging participation. That the workers found the experience empowering was clear 
and they undeniably felt a sense of ownership of the network and the decisions it made. 
This was something Rachel, a worker, felt particularly strongly about:  
‘A lot of people [outsiders] say we [OUR Walmart members] are part of the union, 
that the union does this [all]… They [the UFCW] support us, they give us classes, 
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they give us the ability to learn new things, they are there to lend us a helping hand. 
But we are OUR Walmart – the associates [Walmart workers] and at the end of the 
day I wouldn’t be here if I thought it was a publicity [front for the UFCW].’   
The relationship between union and network was not marked by the cultural conflict 
between a bureaucratic union and the horizontal network that the literature suggests. 
Although it was too early to investigate the long-term sustainability of the network, it had 
lasted two years in the open without fragmenting, and had managed to maintain enough 
solidity to undertake some significant actions.  
With a sense of collective interests and an organisational structure in place which is 
able to support mobilisation, MT suggests that an important element influencing 
collective action is the opportunity for different forms of action to be successful. The 
mobilisation at Walmart lacked the economic and political sources of power which the 
US labour movement has traditionally relied upon, such as strikes and state-enforced 
recognition. But Wright and Brown (2013) argue that employers’ increasing sensitivity 
about their public reputations may present an alternative ‘opportunity structure.’ Indeed, 
Chun’s (2009) ethnographic studies of union organising of cleaners and domestic care 
workers in the US and cleaners and golf caddies in the South Korea demonstrates the 
importance of such symbolic power. The workers she studied were successful owing to 
their ability to manipulate socially accepted concepts and norms in order to legitimise 
their struggle. 
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Vulnerability to reputational damage explains why the Walmart mobilisation 
emphasised high profile confrontational direct action aimed at the raising of public 
awareness. This was summed up by UFCW organiser, Ali: 
‘We are much more about taking direct action… you know we are taking action now and 
doing something about it now rather than waiting for the law to do something.'      
Hyman (1989) states that strikes are, by their very nature, collective, but when Walmart 
workers took strike action it was as part of a small workplace group of around five 
workers at most and sometimes even lone individuals. It was only because of their 
interconnectedness through MSCNs, particularly Facebook, that it came to be seen as 
truly a collective act. The other major form of action was similarly dramatic civil 
disobedience which resulted in workers and supporters being led away in handcuffs. The 
first time this tactic was used was during the 2012 'Black Friday' strike when workers, 
family, and supporters from the clergy in the LA Area blockaded the road outside a store 
for two hours before being arrested. The spectacle of these direct actions was heightened 
by the presence of large numbers of supporters.  
MSCNs played two crucial roles in these actions. Firstly, they were an effective 
means of spreading word of the dozens of disparate but simultaneous actions through 
Facebook ‘Events,’ while the lack of rigid organisational or communicative boundaries 
enabled the expansive networking of support for these actions. This support included 
other low-wage workers and labour and community groups and meant that significant 
solidarity was mobilised both physically and financially. For example, the sheriff’s 
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department reported that the main 2012 LA Area demonstration was supported by 1000 
labour and community allies (Fox, 2012).  
Secondly, MSCNs enabled traditional and self-generated coverage of these 
actions to be widely disseminated. For example, OUR Walmart (2013) claims there were 
over 300,000 posts on Facebook and 60,000 tweets on Twitter about the 2012 'Black 
Friday' strike. The swarming of these actions and their representation through MSCNs 
increased media interest. Nevertheless, this required the union to play the role of network 
orchestrator to bring together the actions effectively and strategically. The force 
multiplier effect of swarming can be seen by the fact that the 2012 'Black Friday' strike 
involved a relatively small number of workers stopping work for a single shift but created 
a significant level of media coverage of working conditions at Walmart. For example, 
during November 2011 the only coverage relating to working conditions at Walmart in 
the New York Times amounted to just 57 words in one article. Whereas during 
November 2012 there were 2089 words across six articles.3 According to a senior UFCW 
official, the print and website coverage generated by OUR Walmart alone was equivalent 
to $24 million of advertisements in 2012 and $31 million in 20134. As Michael Bender 
(2012), President of Walmart West, put it: ‘the media coverage created the illusion that 
Walmart's associates were protesting instead of serving customers.'  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Own analysis. 
4 Personal correspondence. 
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Finally, that workers did not have access to a PC at work was not a barrier to 
MCSNs playing an important role. Workers carried smartphones with them, enabling 
easy access to the OUR Walmart network. The use of MSCNs was not confined to 
younger workers or those with higher levels of Internet proficiency. In fact, of the five 
worker informants aged over 60, three made frequent use of MSCNs. The benefits of 
MSCN use were consistent with the expectations derived from the IFN literature. The 
data also supports Jianhua’s (2011) finding that the ease with which MSCNs can be 
closely monitored is not an insurmountable problem. Though it was no doubt easy for 
managers to observe workers on the open pages of social networking sites such as 
Facebook, what actually matters in terms of participation is not whether they were under 
surveillance or not, but whether they felt they were. Moreover, this sense of freedom 
from surveillance could be heightened with little cost by the use of more secure online 
spaces such as video conferencing and private local Facebook pages. 
 
Discussion: the efficacy and logic of MSCN mobilisation  
This investigation into MSCNs replicates many of the findings of previous studies, 
outlined above, which identify ways in which IFNs are advantageous to workplace 
organisation. In particular, MSCNs were found to: overcome workers’ negative 
dispositions towards unions and engage a new generation of workers. Increasing the 
density of communication, level of participation, and internal vibrancy aided the creation 
of a collective identity; and facilitated the organisation and propagation of swarming 
actions.  
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Importantly, the above findings demonstrate that MSCNs do not suffer from the 
barriers to access which have been found to exist for traditional IFNs. Workers did not 
need the use of a PC at work in order to participate as they had smartphones which 
enabled them to access the network. MSCNs in this context were not only used by young 
workers or those with a higher level of Internet proficiency. MSCNs and smartphones 
have a high level of interface simplicity which does not require specialist computer-
related knowledge. This is the very reason that they have been so widely adopted, 
compared to earlier eras of the Internet and computer software.  
The findings also provide no evidence for the suggestion by Saundry et al. (2006; 
2007; 2012) that the type of collective identity which develops through networks is 
incompatible with the broad-based political identity of contemporary trade unions. In 
fact, the collective identity forged amongst Walmart workers coalesced into a class-based 
notion of exploited low-wage workers. There are two potential reasons for this. Firstly, 
the findings of Saundry et al. may have been overly influenced by the specific workers 
whom they studied. These workers were highly skilled and professionalised freelance 
media workers. In fact, Saundry et al. (2012: 271) themselves state that the identity which 
developed through the networks they studied were: ‘mediated by common experiences 
and a discourse rooted in the nature of the labour process.’ The narrow collegial 
collective identity which they identify perhaps reveals more about freelance media 
workers then it does about networks. This might suggest that, while IFNs facilitate the 
generation of greater levels of collective identity; the form they take will be rooted in the 
labour process and workplace organisation.  
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Secondly, the broad-based collective identity of the Walmart mobilisation could 
also, in part, be a reflection of the 'expansive networking' which is a result of MSCNs 
being de-centred and lacking in defined boundaries, compared to traditional website 
forum and email-based networks (Castells, 2012). This means that broader sets of 
connections are likely to form as anyone can connect to the network. This is what 
happened as the Walmart mobilisation continued over time. As the identities of Walmart 
and fast food workers were increasingly linked together through MSCNs, the OUR 
Walmart collective identity transformed from one focused on being exploited workers of 
a specific employer to a general sense of being exploited low-wage workers.  
Saundry et al. go on to argue that the collegial identity which they associate with 
networks means that users of networks will not see themselves as members of an 
organisation, will wish to remain independent from unions, and that any attempt by 
unions to create, organise, and take over networks will be self-defeating as it will 
inevitably erode the network’s collegial collective identity. These propositions are also 
not supported by this study. Not only did MSCN users identify as members of an 
organisation, but that organisation was set up, and its direction were heavily influenced 
by a broad-based union. 
The findings support the view that networks do not require total autonomy but 
rather an orchestrator who can provide strategic oversight (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2000; 
Heckscher and McCarthy, 2014), as long as the orchestrator does not attempt to 
bureaucratise communication and instead allows the quick and easy sharing of 
information across the network. Despite being bureaucratic themselves, it is possible for 
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unions to interact with networks in this way. In fact, in this case MSCN activities 
complemented the initial union organising, which then facilitated the development of 
mobilisation but which was not independent or spontaneous. Saundry et al. then are 
wrong to suggest that unions are limited to tapping into existing networks. The 
incongruence which much of the literature (Diamond and Freeman 2002; Heckscher and 
Carré, 2006: Saundry et al. 2007; 2012) suggests exists between the bureaucratic, 
centralised, and hierarchical nature of unions and decentralised horizontal networks is not 
inevitable. Unlike the findings of Fitzgerald et al. (2012) and Panagiotopoulos (2012), the 
union did not attempt to use the IFN in a traditional hierarchical way based upon vertical 
downwards communication. Instead, the union acted as a facilitator of network 
participation, seeking to increase the bottom up density of network communication. This 
mirrors findings that successful union organising requires ‘managed activism’ - 
leadership commitment to building membership-led organising campaigns while 
coordinating strategy and structural change from the centre (Simms, 2007).  
 Let us now turn to the more difficult question of whether this MSCN-based 
mobilisation had the solidity to achieve the concrete industrial relations outcomes 
necessary to justify the high level of resources it consumed? Hobsbawm (1952) demands 
that the effectiveness of the labour organisations of the 18th century be judged according 
to the actually existing alternatives. Likewise, given the high level of surveillance, fear of 
retaliation, and lack of structural power of these workers, even if a more traditional union 
structure were seen as superior, it seems highly unlikely that a mobilisation would be able 
to take such a form in the foreseeable future. For better or worse, mobilisations taking 
place in similar contexts to Walmart may have to partly adopt network forms as the only 
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realistic manner in which they are possible. The big question, then, is whether such 
networks can achieve influence despite having low density and a lack of structural 
economic power? 
Sidney and Beatrice Webb's (1896) classic definition of a union is mostly 
concerned with the improvement of conditions through formal collective bargaining. The 
Webbs also highlight how collective bargaining is dependent upon the collective threat of 
withholding labour through strikes. But the Webbs’ analysis is problematic in terms of 
union renewal. As Wright and Brown (2013) suggest, the internationalising of product 
markets and corporate ownership have undermined the possibilities for multi-employer 
bargaining while the intensification of competition and greater fragmentation of labour 
and product markets have, in turn, undermined the possibilities for single-employer 
bargaining. It also requires employer ‘recognition’ of union bargaining rights. However, 
over the past two decades there has been substantial ‘procedural individualisation’ 
(Brown et al., 2000) of employment relations in countries such as the US and this can be 
equated with de facto de-recognition. 
But Hobsbawm (1952: 58) demonstrates that the Webbs’ focus upon strikes and 
formal collective bargaining is empirically and conceptually myopic. During the mid18th 
and early 19th century, workers’ capacity to influence their employers lay in ‘machine-
wrecking, rioting and the destruction of property in general (or, in modern terms, 
sabotage and direct action).’ This direct action could usually be counted on to improve 
workers’ conditions and created a minimum floor for standards which employers 
understood needed to be maintained in order to avoid the destruction of their property.  
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In addition, OUR Walmart’s power cannot be understood via the direct economic 
damage of its strikes, but rather by its ability to undertake direct action which could 
damage the reputation of Walmart. Hence it should be understood as an example of what 
might be termed: ‘raising labour standards through reputational damage.’ Chun (2009) 
argues that symbolic power is most effective when used against institutions which are 
sensitive to public opinion, a category which Walmart, as a low-cost discount retailer, 
does not seem to fit into. Additionally, Walmart is also unusual for a major multi-national 
in that it remains family controlled (Lichtenstein, 2009), consequently reputational risk in 
terms of share price is reduced. The tactics adopted in this mobilisation are, therefore, 
likely to be more effective when utilised against other employers such as governments, 
brand-driven companies, and universities.  
The mobilisation at Walmart was not, however, necessarily misdirected. With 
reference to workers direct action in the 18th century, Hobsbawm (1952) explains that the 
state can play an important role in raising labour standards as a result of direct action. 
There were two ways in which the Walmart mobilisation might have influenced the state 
in order to achieve industrial relations outcomes. First, Walmart had reached market 
saturation in its traditional markets and same-store-sales had been declining in recent 
years. This made expansion into metropolitan markets, which in the past it avoided owing 
to the presence of unions, crucial (Lichtenstein, 2009). Yet this expansion could be 
delayed and even blocked by concerned local authorities, as recently happened in New 
York City (Greenhouse and Clifford, 2013). Thus symbolic sources of power could be 
translated into a political source of power by compelling Democrat politicians to believe 
that it would be untenable for them to support new Walmart developments. Potential 
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evidence of the success of this approach is that in 2015 Walmart announced that it would 
raise its starting pay rate to $9 an hour, improving the pay of 500,000 workers, and then 
to $10 an hour in 2016 (Isidore, 2015). This equates to around 12% and 25% more than 
what many workers in this study were being paid at the time. 
The second route through which the mobilisation might have influenced the state in 
order to help achieve its goals is through minimum wage laws. For example, in California 
before the mobilisation the minimum wage had remained at $8.00 per hour since 2008. 
However, in September 2013 (17 months before Walmart increased its starting pay 
nationally) Democrats increased it to $9.00 per hour from July 2014 onwards, and to 
$10.00 per hour from January 2016 onwards. Additionally, in 2014 Democrats in San 
Francisco and Oakland both raised their minimum wages respectively to $15.00 per hour 
from 2018 and $12.25 per hour from March 2015. Los Angeles is expected to enact a 
similar raise in the near future (Hirsch, 2014). This suggests that reputational damage can 
achieve concrete outcomes regardless of the total denial of recognition by employers.   
 
Conclusion  
This article has demonstrated that MSCNs have the potential to significantly benefit 
workplace mobilisations. They can help to overcome negative dispositions towards 
unions and engage a new generation of workers, increase the density of communication 
and the level of participation, aid the formation of collective identity, facilitates 
organisation and spreads swarming actions. MSCNs overcome many of the weaknesses 
of traditional IFNs identified in previous studies. Having limited access to a PC at work, 
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being older or less Internet proficient were not barriers to MSCN participation. 
Importantly, the collective identity which developed through MSCNs was compatible 
with the broad political identity associated with trade unions. Similarly, no barriers to the 
successful establishment of networks by unions were identified, casting doubt on the oft-
expressed belief in the inevitable clash between the hierarchical nature of unions and the 
horizontal nature of networks. In fact, unions may be well suited to playing the crucial 
role of network orchestrator in order to provide strategic oversight and coordination.  
The raising of labour standards through reputational damage rather than formal 
collective bargaining is also identified as the mobilisation’s rationale. This is arguably 
better suited to contemporary socio-economic conditions marked by the 
internationalisation of product markets and ownership; increased competition and 
fragmentation of labour and product markets; and the procedural individualisation of 
employment relationships than formal collective bargaining. It is also a strategy which is 
likely to be more appropriate to mobilisations targeting organisations which are more 
concerned with risks to their reputations, or in situations in which the state is more 
directly involved in the employment relationship. Although it is not currently possible to 
determine whether the mobilisation at Walmart is sustainable, the use of MSCNs to raise 
labour standards through reputational damage may provide a fruitful approach for other 
workers.   
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